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Abstract
We propose a dynamic model of an oligopoly industry characterized by spatial competition
between multi-store ﬁrms. Firms compete in prices and decide where to open or close stores
depending on demand conditions and the number of competitors at diﬀerent locations, and
on location-speciﬁc private-information shocks. We provide an algorithm to compute Markov
Perfect Equilibria (MPE) in our model. We conduct several numerical experiments to study how
the propensity of multi-store retailers to spatial preemptive behavior depends on the magnitude
of entry costs, exit value and transportation costs.
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Multi-store retailers account for more than 60% of sales in food retailing, drugstores, and bookstores
(Hollander and Omura, 1989). Geographic location is in many cases the most important source
of product diﬀerentiation for these ﬁrms. It is also a forward-looking decision with signiﬁcant
non-recoverable entry costs, mainly due to capital investments which are both ﬁrm- and location-
speciﬁc. Thus, sunk costs, and the dynamic strategic behavior associated with them, are important
forces behind the conﬁguration of the spatial market structure that we observe in retail markets.
Despite its relevance, there have been very few studies analyzing spatial competition as a dy-
namic game. Existent models of industry dynamics often lack an explicit account of spatial com-
petition. Although useful applications have emerged from the seminal work by Ericson and Pakes
(1995), none have explicitly incorporated the spatial and multi-store features which are prevalent
in many retailing industries.1 The literature on spatial competition often restricts the treatment of
time. Models based on the seminal work of Hotelling (1929) describe a two- or three-period frame-
work where ﬁrms choose locations and then compete in the product market.2 Eaton and Lipsey
(1975), Schmalensee (1978), and Bonanno (1987) study the multi-store monopolist under the threat
of entry. They ﬁnd that, depending on the magnitude of entry costs, the monopolist will either
proliferate or strategically locate its stores to deter entry, successfully preempting the competition.
Judd (1985) notes that the aforementioned models place strong assumptions on ﬁrms’ level of com-
mitment. These papers assume that entry and location decisions are completely irreversible, with
no possibility of exit or relocation. Judd shows that when there is strong substitutability among
stores (i.e. proximity in space), allowing for exit may result in non-successful spatial preemption
by the incumbent. Potential entrants know the incumbent ﬁrm may prefer to have a monopoly in
a single location rather than being a monopolist in a location and a duopolist in another nearby
location. Therefore, spatial preemption and entry deterrence by the incumbent is not a credible
(i.e., equilibrium) strategy.
Judd’s paper emphasizes that models of spatial competition between multi-store ﬁrms need
to incorporate dynamics to its full extent, allowing for endogenous ﬁrm entry, store proliferation,
exit, and forward-looking strategies. That is the intention of this paper. In this context, the
contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we propose a dynamic model of an oligopoly industry
1Examples of applications of the Ericson-Pakes framework are Pakes and McGuire (1994), Gowrisankaran’s (1999)
study of mergers, Markowitz’s (2003) study of network eﬀects, and Benkard’s (2004) study of the commercial aircraft
industry. Ellickson and Beresteanu (2005) is also in that framework. They endogenize supermarkets’ “store density,”
i.e., the number of stores per capita a ﬁrm owns in a market. However, spatial competition per se is not accounted
for.
2Hay (1976), Prescott and Visscher (1977), Lane (1980), and Neven (1987) use the concept of subgame-perfect
equilibrium to study pre-speciﬁed sequential entry by single-store ﬁrms. Firms incur entry costs but relocation is
prohibitively expensive. They ﬁnd that strategic product positioning is pursued by earlier movers to either deter
entry or take proﬁtable locations ﬁrst. For a compilation of spatial competition models see Anderson et al. (1992).
1characterized by spatial competition between multi-store ﬁrms. In this model, ﬁrms compete in
prices and decide where to open or close stores depending on the location proﬁle of competitors,
demand conditions, and location-speciﬁc private-information shocks. We deﬁne and characterize a
Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) in this model. Our framework is a useful tool to study multi-
store competition issues that involve spatial and dynamic considerations. Some examples of topics
within this class are: the evaluation of the welfare eﬀects of possible mergers between multi-store
ﬁrms; understanding the main factors that explain the patterns in the evolution of multi-store
retailers such as Wal-Mart, Starbucks, or McDonalds; or studying the conditions under which
spatial preemptive behavior is an equilibrium strategy.3
A second contribution of this paper is to provide an algorithm to compute an equilibrium of the
model. The algorithm exploits simulation techniques that have been recently proposed for solv-
ing single-agent dynamic models (Rust, 1997), and for the estimation of dynamic games (Bajari,
Benkard, and Levin, 2006). We apply and extend these ideas to the computation of equilibria in
dynamic games of spatial competition.4 The main idea behind our algorithm is that when ﬁrms cal-
culate the expected value associated with a possible action, they do it by integrating only through
the most likely paths of future exogenous state variables. Many low-probability paths of these
state variables are not taken into account. This assumption reduces very substantially the cost of
calculating these expected values and of computing an equilibrium. The algorithm provides an ap-
proximation to the actual MPE. However, an alternative interpretation is that the algorithm obtains
the actual MPE of a model where ﬁrms face computational costs and use simulation techniques to
minimize these costs when making decisions.
To illustrate the model and the algorithm, we present several numerical examples that analyze
how the propensity of multi-store retailers to spatial preemptive behavior depends on the magnitude
of sunk costs. With this purpose, we have to start with a useful deﬁnition of spatial preemption.
Previous deﬁnitions have been based on simple three-period games where ﬁrms move sequentially,
and in equilibrium there either is or there is not pre-emption. Instead we consider spatial pre-
emptive behavior (both in practice and in the context of our model) to be a matter of degree, and
propose an index that measures the intensity of ﬁrms’ preemptive behavior in a market. This index
c a nb ec a l c u l a t e du s i n gi n f o r m a t i o no nﬁrms’ decisions of where to open/close their stores. In our
numerical examples we calculate this index using simulated data from the equilibrium of the model.
Then, we look at how this index varies when we modify some parameters of the model, i.e., entry
costs, exit value and transportation costs. We also look at the relationship between the spatial
preemption index and several market outcomes such as number of stores, proﬁts and markups.
3The model in sections 5 and 6 of Judd (1983) is the closest to ours in the literature. However, Judd’s model is
still highly stylized relative to our model.
4The software for this algorithm, in GAUSS language, can be downloaded from the authors’ web pages. In a
companion paper we provide a manual that describes in detail the programs and procedures in this software (see
Aguirregabiria and Vicentini, 2006).
2The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes
the algorithm used to solve for equilibria. Section 4 presents the numerical exercises on spatial
preemptive behavior. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2M o d e l
2.1 The Market
Consider a local market of a diﬀerentiated retail product (e.g., retail banking, supermarkets). From
a geographic point of view the market is a compact set C in the Euclidean space R2. The distance
between two points in the market, say a and b, is the Euclidean distance denoted by ka − bk.
There is a ﬁnite set of L pre-speciﬁed locations where it is feasible for ﬁrms to operate stores. Let
{z1,z 2,...,zL} be the set of geographical coordinates of these feasible locations, where z  ∈ C.W e
call each of this business locations a submarket. As a real life example, ﬁgure 1 presents the location
of eight shopping malls (circles) in the city of Tulsa, Oklahoma.5 These malls can be thought as
the feasible locations for retailers such as large department stores.
FIGURE 1
Shopping Malls in Tulsa, Oklahoma
Time is discrete. At time t the market is populated by a continuum of consumers. Each
consumer is characterized by a geographical location z ∈ C. The geographical distribution of
consumers at period t is given by the absolute measure φt(z) such that
R
C φt(dz)=Mt, where Mt
is the size of the market. This measure φt evolves over time according to a discrete Markov process.
Let Ω be the discrete set of possible φt’s.
5Satellite picture constructed using the free software Google Earth,a v a i l a b l ea thttp://earth.google.com/.
3There are I multi-store ﬁrms that can potentially operate in the market. We index ﬁrms by i
and use Υ = {1,2,...,I} to represent the set of ﬁrms. At the beginning of period t a ﬁrm’s network
is represented by the vector nit =( ni1t,n i2t,...,niLt), where ni t is the number of stores that ﬁrm
i operates in location   at period t. For simplicity, we assume that a ﬁr mc a nh a v ea tm o s to n e
s t o r ei nal o c a t i o n ,s u c ht h a tni t ∈ {0,1}. The model can be easily generalized to the case with
a maximum of ¯ n>1 stores per location and ﬁrm.6 Overlapping of stores from diﬀerent ﬁrms
at the same location is allowed. The spatial market structure at period t is represented by the
vector nt =( n1t,n 2t,...,nIt) ∈ {0,1}IL. A store in this market is identiﬁed by a pair (i, ) where i
represents the ﬁrm, and   identiﬁes the location.
We conclude this sub-section providing a big picture of the structure of the model. The details
are in sections 2.2 to 2.4. Every period t, ﬁrms observe the spatial market structure nt,t h e
state of the demand φt,a n ds o m el o c a t i o n -a n dﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks in entry, exit and ﬁxed costs,
which are private information of each ﬁrm. Given this information, incumbent ﬁrms compete in
prices. Prices can vary over stores within the same ﬁrm. This spatial Bertrand game is static
because current prices do not have any eﬀect on future demand or proﬁts. Furthermore, private
information shocks aﬀect ﬁxed operating costs and entry costs but not the demand or variable costs.
Therefore, these shocks do not have any inﬂuence in equilibrium prices. The resulting Bertrand
prices determine equilibrium variable proﬁts for each ﬁrm i at period t.A tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt, ﬁrms
decide simultaneously their network of stores for next period. This choice is dynamic because of
partial irreversibility in the decision to open a new store, i.e., sunk costs. Firms are allowed to open
or close at most one store per period. Exogenous changes in the spatial distribution of demand
(i.e., changes in φt), as well as ﬁrms’ location-speciﬁc shocks to costs, generate simultaneous entry
and exit at diﬀerent locations and changes over time in the spatial market structure. Firms may
grow over time in the geographic context and expand their network of stores, and possibly become
a dominant player.
2.2 Consumer Behavior7
A consumer is fully characterized by a pair (z,υ), where z is her location in space and υ ∈ RIL
is a vector representing her idiosyncratic preferences over all possible stores. Consumer behavior
is static and demand is unitary. At every period t, consumers know all active stores with their
respective locations and prices. A consumer decides whether to buy or not a unit of the good, and
from which ﬁrm and store to buy it. The indirect utility of consumer (z,υ) patronizing store (i, )
at time t is:
u(i, )=ωi − pi t − τ kz − z k + υi  (1)
6Some retail industries are characterized by ﬁrms having more than one store in a particular submarket. Starbucks
often has multiple coﬀee shops in large malls.
7De Palma et al. (1985) consider a similar demand system but in a linear city.
4ωi is the quality of the product oﬀered by ﬁrm i, common across its locations. All consumers
agree on this measure. pi t is the mill price charged by store (i, ) at time t.T h et e r mτ kz − z k
represents consumer’s transportation costs, where τ is the unit transportation cost. Finally, υi 
captures consumer idiosyncratic preferences for store (i, ). The utility of the outside alternative
(i.e., not purchasing the good) is normalized to zero.
A consumer purchases a unit of the good at store (i, ) iﬀ u(i, ) ≥ 0 and u(i, ) ≥ u(i0,  0) for
any (i0,  0). To obtain the aggregate demand at each store we have to integrate individual demands
over the distribution of (z,υ).W ea s s u m et h a tυ is independent of z and it has a Extreme Value
distribution with dispersion parameter μ. The parameter μ measures the importance of horizontal
product diﬀerentiation, other than spatial diﬀerentiation. Integrating over υ we obtain the local
demand for store (i, ) from consumers at location z:
di (z,nt,pt)=





 0=1 ni0 0t exp{(ωi0 − pi0 0t − τ kz − z 0k)/μ}
(2)
Integrating these local demands over the spatial distribution of consumers we obtain the aggregate




di (z,nt,pt) φt(dz) (3)
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φt(dz) (4)








di (z,nt,pt) τ kz − z k φt(dz) (5)
A few comments about this demand system are needed. Consumers’ substitution patterns
depend directly on the distance function kz − z k, so that a store competes more ﬁercely against
closer stores. Stores’ market areas are overlapping because of the unobserved heterogeneity of
consumers, υ. Therefore a store serves consumers from all corners of the city C,b u tm o r es ot h e
nearby patronage. Stores will always face a positive demand and can adjust prices without facing
a perfectly elastic demand. Firms face the trade-oﬀ between strategic and market share eﬀects.
As stores locate closer to each other, the more intense price competition acts as a centrifugal
force of dispersion (strategic eﬀect). At the same time, ﬁrms wish to locate where transportation
costs are minimum, which acts as a centripetal force of agglomeration (market share eﬀect). An
equilibrium spatial market structure would balance these forces, along with the eﬀect of own-ﬁrm
stores cannibalization.
Finally, we note the importance of the parameters μ and τ that capture product diﬀerentiation.
As μ → 0 the degree of non-spatial horizontal product diﬀerentiation becomes smaller and market
5areas become well deﬁned and predictable, with a consumer strictly shopping at the store with
lowest full price (quality-adjusted mill price plus transportation costs) from her location. At the
limit we would observe market areas deﬁned as Voronoi graphs (or Thiessen polygons) with well-
deﬁned market borders (see Eaton and Lipsey, 1975, or Tabuchi, 1994, among others). Higher
transportation cost τ increases the importance of location and the isolation of consumers, serving
as a shield for market power and creating incentives for ﬁrm dispersion.8
2.3 Price Competition
For notational simplicity we omit the time subindex in this subsection. Every period, ﬁrms compete
in prices taking as given their network of stores, the state of the demand, and variable costs.
Firms may charge diﬀerent prices at diﬀerent stores. This price competition is a game of complete
information. A ﬁrm variable proﬁtf u n c t i o ni s :
Ri(n,p,φ)=
XL
 =1 (pi  − ci (di)) Di (n,p,φ) (6)
ci (di) is the unit variable cost of ﬁrm i, constant across its stores. This cost is an increasing function
of di,t h ea v e r a g ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e na l lt h es t o r e si nt h en e t w o r ko fﬁrm i.9 This speciﬁcation
captures the existence of economies of density in marginal costs. For a given number of stores,
it is more costly to operate a network the larger the distance between the stores, such that scope
economies are positively related to the proximity of own-ﬁrm stores. Distribution costs are a source
of economies of density. It seems plausible that most of these economies of density operate through
ﬁxed costs. We incorporate that feature in the model (see section 2.4 below). However, economies
of density may also reduce marginal costs. For instance, unit inventory costs can be smaller when
stores are closer to each other because it is easier for these stores to share inventories in case
of stockouts. Note that with this structure of variable costs, ﬁrms pass part of the gains from
economies of density to consumers in terms of lower prices. That is not the case when economies of
density operate only through ﬁxed costs. See the work by Holmes (2006) on economies of density
and the implications on the dynamics of store location by multi-store ﬁrms.
Each ﬁrm maximizes its variable proﬁt by choosing its best-response vector of prices. The best
response of ﬁrm i can be characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition for each price pi :









The ﬁrst two terms are the price and output eﬀects of pi  on its own store (i, ), while the last term
is the output eﬀect of pi  on all other stores of ﬁrm i. In our demand system, stores of a same
8Besides computing equilbrium prices, our Bertrand algorithm computes demand price elasticities for each location
and store at these prices. These elasticities help the researcher better understand what are the actual market areas
in geographic space. The detection of the relevant geographical market area has long been debated among antitrust
authorities (see Willig, 1991, and Baker, 1997).










 06=  ni  ni 0
l
.
6ﬁrm are gross substitutes, i.e., ∂Di 0/∂pi  > 0 and therefore the third term is always positive. This
implies that, ceteris paribus, a multi-store ﬁrm will oﬀer higher prices than a single-store ﬁrm.
Following Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995), we deﬁne a square matrix Λ of dimension









if i0 = i
0 otherwise
(8)
We can write the entire system of best-response equations as D(p) − Λ(p) · (p − c)=0 ,o rw h a t
is equivalent:
p = c + Λ(p)
−1 · D(p) (9)
A spatial Nash-Bertrand equilibrium is then a vector p∗ that solves the ﬁxed-point mapping (9).
Given our assumptions on the distribution of consumer taste heterogeneity υ,t h em a p p i n g sD(p)
and Λ(p) are continuously diﬀerentiable. Furthermore, the vector of prices p b e l o n g st oac o m p a c t
set. Every price is greater or equal than its corresponding unit variable cost, and it is smaller
or equal than the monopoly price of a ﬁrm with L stores and maximum quality ωi. Therefore,
by Brower’s ﬁxed-point theorem, a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium exists. This proof of existence can
be extended to other speciﬁcations of the distribution of the vector υ of consumer heterogeneous
t a s t e s ,a sl o n ga st h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fυ is such that the functions D(p) and Λ(p) are continuous in
p.
The equilibrium is not necessarily unique. This is a problem if we want to use the model for
comparative statics or to study the eﬀects of public policies. To deal with this issue we assume a
particular equilibrium selection mechanism. This criterion for equilibrium selection is incorporated
in the algorithm that we use to compute the equilibrium. We select the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium
that we converge to when the ﬁxed-point algorithm is initialized with prices equal to marginal costs
c. This implies that we select the equilibrium with the lowest equilibrium prices.10 Let p∗ (n,φ) be
the vector of equilibrium prices associated with a value (n,φ) of the state variables. Solving this
vector into the variable proﬁt function one obtains the equilibrium variable proﬁtf u n c t i o n :
R∗
i (n,φ) ≡ Ri(n,p∗ (n,φ),φ) (10)
2.4 Dynamic game
At the end of period t ﬁrms simultaneously choose their network of stores nt+1 with an understand-
ing that they will aﬀect their variable proﬁts at future periods. We model the location choice as a
game of incomplete information, so that each ﬁrm i has to form beliefs about other ﬁrms’ choices
10Alternatively, we might select the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium that we converge to when the ﬁxed-point algorithm
is initialized with prices equal to monopoly prices. In that case, we would be selecting the equilibrium with the
highest prices.
7of networks.11 More speciﬁcally, there are components of the entry costs and exit values of a store
which are ﬁrm-speciﬁc and private information. We assume that a ﬁr mm a yo p e no rc l o s eat most
one store per period. Given that we can make the frequency of ﬁrms’ decisions arbitrarily high,
this is a plausible assumption that reduces signiﬁcantly the cost of computing an equilibrium in
this model.
Let ait be the decision of ﬁrm i at period t such that: ait =  + represents the decision of opening
a new store at location  ; ait =  − m e a n st h a tas t o r ea tl o c a t i o n  is closed; and ait =0means the
ﬁrm chooses to do nothing. Therefore, the choice set is A = {0,  +,  − :   =1 ,2,...,L}.S o m eo ft h e
choice alternatives in A may not be feasible for a ﬁrm given her current network nit.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
a ﬁrm can not close a store in a submarket where it has no stores, and it can not open a new store
in a location where it already has a store. We incorporate these constraints in the speciﬁcation of
the proﬁt function below. In particular, there is a cost K of taking this type of actions, where K
is a very large number.
2.4.1 Speciﬁcation of the proﬁt function
Firm i’s current proﬁti s :
πi (ait,nt,φ t,ε it)=R∗
i (nt,φ t) − FC(nit) − ECit + EVit (11)
FC(nit) is the ﬁx e dc o s to fo p e r a t i n ga l lt h es t o r e so fﬁrm i. ECit is the entry cost of creating
a new store. And EVit is the exit value of closing a store. Fixed operating costs depend on the








  is the ﬁxed cost of operating a store in submarket  . dit is the average distance between all the
stores in the network of ﬁrm i,a sd e ﬁned above, and θED(.) is an increasing real valued function
that captures the existence of economies of density. For a given number of stores, it is more costly
to operate a network the larger the distance between the stores. The speciﬁcation of entry cost is:
ECit =
PL
 =1 I{ait =  +}
¡
θEC




I{.} is the indicator function. θEC
  is the entry cost at location  ,a n dK is an arbitrarily large
number that accounts for the restriction that a ﬁrm cannot open more than one store in the same
location. The variable εEC
i t represents a ﬁrm- and location-speciﬁc component of the entry cost.
This idiosyncratic shock is private information of ﬁrm i.T h es p e c i ﬁcation of the exit value is:
EVit =
PL
 =1 I{ait =  −}
¡
θEV




11See Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2003) for an analysis of dynamic games of incomplete information.
8θEV
  i st h es c r a p p i n go re x i tv a l u eo fas t o r ei nl o c a t i o n .T h et e r mK(1 − ni t) accounts for the
restriction that it is not possible to close a store that does not exist. The variable εEV
i t is a ﬁrm-
and location-speciﬁcs h o c ki nt h ee x i tv a l u eo fas t o r e .
The vector of private information variables for ﬁrm i at period t is εit = {εEC
i t ,ε EV
i t :   =
1,2,...,L}. We make two assumptions on their distribution. First, we assume the vectors εit’s are
i n d e p e n d e n to fd e m a n dc o n d i t i o nφt, and independently distributed across ﬁrms and over time.
Independence across ﬁrms implies that a ﬁrm cannot learn about other ﬁrms’ ε’s by using its
own private information. And independence over time means that a ﬁrm cannot use other ﬁrms’
histories of previous decisions to infer their current ε’s. These assumptions simplify signiﬁcantly
the computation of an equilibrium in this dynamic game. Second, we assume the εit’s have support
over the entire real line with a cumulative distribution increasing with respect to every argument.
These two assumptions allow for a broad range of speciﬁcations for the εit’s, including spatially
correlated shocks.
2.4.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
We consider that a ﬁrm’s strategy depends only on its payoﬀ relevant state variables (nt,φ t,ε it).
Let α ≡ {αi(nt,φ t,ε it):i ∈ Υ} be a set of strategy functions, one for each ﬁrm, such that
αi : {0,1}IL×Ω×R2L → A. A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in this game is a set of strategy
functions such that each ﬁrm’s strategy maximizes the value of the ﬁrm for each possible (nt,φ t,ε it)
and taking other ﬁrms’ strategies as given.
To characterize a MPE in this model, we ﬁrst describe a ﬁrm’s best response function. Let
ψi(nt,φ t,ε it;α) be ﬁrm i’s best response function that is deﬁned as:
ψi(nt,φ t,ε it;α) = arg max
ait∈A
{ πi (ait,nt,φ t,ε it)+vα
i (ait,nt,φ t) } (15)
where vα
i (ait,nt,φ t) is the expect future proﬁts of ﬁrm i if his current decision is ait and all the
ﬁrms, including ﬁrm i, behave in the future according to their respective strategy functions in α.
That is,
vα


















where the expectation is taken over all the possible future paths of {φt+j,ε t+j}.W eu s et h es u p e r -
index α in nα
t+j to emphasize that the evolution of future networks of stores depends on the strategy
functions in α. Note that ψi(nt,φ t,ε it;α) is a best response to other ﬁrms’ strategies but also to
the own ﬁrm strategy αi. That is, this best response function incorporates a ‘policy iteration’ in
the ﬁrm’s dynamic programming problem. The Representation Lemma in Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2006) shows that we can use this type of best response functions to characterize every MPE in the
9model. That is, a set of strategy functions is a MPE in this model if and only if these strategies
are a ﬁxed point of the best response functions in (15).
D E F I N I T I O N :As e to fs t r a t e g yf u n c t i o n sα∗ ≡ {α∗
i(nt,φ t,ε it):i ∈ Υ} is a MPE in this model if
and only if for any ﬁrm i and any state (nt,φ t,ε it) we have that:
α∗
i(nt,φ t,ε it)=ψi(nt,φ t,ε it;α∗) (17)
Next, we describe the form of the best response function ψi.T a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h es p e c i ﬁca-
tion of the proﬁt function in equations (11) to (14), we have that ﬁrm i’s best response is to open
a store at location   (i.e., ψi(nt,φ t,ε it;α)= +) if the following conditions hold:
−θEC
  − εEC
i t + vα
i ( +,nt,φ t)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
≥− θEC
 0 − εEC
i 0t + vα
i ( 0




 0 + εEV
i 0t + vα
i ( 0
−,nt,φ t) for any  0
(18)
The ﬁrst condition states that submarket   is the best location for ﬁrm i to open a new store. The
other two conditions establish that opening a new store is better than doing nothing and better
than closing a store, respectively. Similarly, we have that ﬁrm i’s best response is to close as t o r e
at location   (i.e., ψi(nt,φ t,ε it;α)= −) if the following conditions hold:
θEV
  + εEV
i t + vα
i ( −,nt,φ t)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
≥ θEV
  + εEV
i 0t + vα
i ( 0




 0 − εEC
i 0t + vα
i ( 0
+,nt,φ t) for any  0
(19)
The ﬁrst condition establishes that submarket   i st h eb e s to n et oc l o s ea ne x i s t i n gs t o r eo fﬁrm i.
The other two conditions state that closing a store is better than doing nothing and better than
opening a new store, respectively.
Equations (18) and (19) show that the strategies in α enter the best response function ψi only
through the value function vα
i . Therefore, we can write the best response function as ψi(nt,φ t,ε it;vα
i ).
This representation is useful to characterize a MPE in this model in terms of the value functions
{vα
i : i ∈ Υ}. And the characterization can be used to prove the existence of a MPE in this model
and to compute an equilibrium. The following Proposition establishes this result.
PROPOSITION: Let α ≡ {αi(nt,φ t,ε it):i ∈ Υ} be a set of strategy functions. And let vα ≡ {vα
i :
i ∈ Υ} be the value functions associated with α as we have deﬁned them in equation (16). Then,
α is a MPE if and only if the vector of value functions vα is a solution to the ﬁxed-point problem





















10where the expectation is taken over all the possible future paths of {φt+j,ε i,t+j},a n dt h en o t a -
tion n
ψ(v)
t+j m e a n st h a tt h ee v o l u t i o no ff u t u r en e t w o r k so fs t o r e si sb a s e do nt h es t r a t e g yf u n c t i o n s
ψi(.,.,.;v).
Proof: Suppose that α is a ﬁxed-point of the mapping (17). Therefore, the vector of value function
vα is equal to vψ(vα), and this implies that vα is a ﬁxed point of the mapping Γ.N o w , s u p p o s e
t h a tav e c t o ro ff u n c t i o n sv is a ﬁxed point of Γ and deﬁne the vector of strategy functions α =
{ψi(.,.,.;v):i ∈ Υ}.I ti sc l e a rt h a tα is an equilibrium of (17). ¥
Given this Proposition, the proof of existence of a MPE is a straightforward application of
Brower’s theorem. Note that the variables (ait,nt,φ t) are discrete and take ﬁnite values. It follows
that: (1) the set of value functions vα can be represented as a vector in the Euclidean space;
(2) this vector can take only a ﬁnite number of values; and (3) by the continuity of the proﬁt
function, these values are bounded. Therefore, vα belongs to a compact set. Our assumptions on
the distribution of the private information shocks imply that Γ is a continuous mapping. Thus, by
Brower’s theorem, an equilibrium exits. Given a vector of equilibrium values vα∗
, we can obtain
the equilibrium strategy functions α∗ using the characterization of the best response function in
equations (18) and (19). We can also obtain the equilibrium choice probability functions:
Pα∗
i (ait|nt,φ t) ≡
Z
I {α∗
i(nt,φ t,ε it)=ait} dG(εit) (21)
where G(.) is the distribution function of the private information shocks. Knowledge of these
functions, combined with the transition probabilities for the exogenous population distribution φt,
allows the researcher to compute the probabilistic evolution of the city-economy given a particular
initial condition, as well as the probabilistic steady-state features of this economy.
The model can have multiple equilibria. This is an issue when we use this model for comparative
statics. We deal with this problem in the same way as we did with multiple equilibria in the Nash-
Bertrand game: we impose an equilibrium selection mechanism. More speciﬁcally, we select the
MPE that we converge to by iterating in the mapping Γ from the initial set of values vα = 0 (i.e.,
the values that correspond to ﬁrms’ myopic behavior, β =0 ).
3 Equilibrium algorithms
3.1 Computation of a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium
Recall the system of ﬁrst-order conditions in the pricing game. For a given value of the state
variables, deﬁne the mapping corresponding to that system as ∆(p) ≡ c + Λ(p)
−1 · D(p).L e t
∆(i) (p) be the elements of ∆(p) associated with the prices of ﬁrm i. Similarly, let p(i) be the
elements of the vector p associated with ﬁrm i. We implement a Gauss-Siedel ﬁxed-point algorithm
which iterates on ﬁrms using the mapping ∆(p). To obtain the lowest price equilibrium, we
11initialize the search with prices equal to marginal costs. Step 0: Start with the vector of prices
p0 such that p0




matrix of partial derivatives Λ
¡
p0¢
using quadrature integration (see below). Step 2: Starting
with ﬁrm 1, obtain a new vector p1






















. Step 3: If
° °p1 − p0° °
is smaller than a pre-ﬁxed small constant, then p∗ = p1. Otherwise, proceed to Step 1 with
p0 = p1.
Therefore, the updating of the vector of prices for player i is done immediately after its compu-
tation, before computing a new vector p1
(i+1) for the next player. Once the price equilibrium under
an equilibrium selection rule is computed, we encode the equilibrium current variable proﬁts of a
ﬁrm given a particular state, Ri(n,φ).
Given the logit assumption on the idiosyncratic tastes, the local demands have the closed form
expression in (2). However, to obtain the vector of aggregate demands D(p) and the matrix of
partial derivatives Λ(p) we have to integrate local demands over the 2-dimensional city C.W e
use a quadrature method with midpoint nodes (see Judd, 1998, ch. 7). We ﬁrst divide C into a
pre-speciﬁed number of mutually exclusive and adjacent rectangular cells, with each cell k having
a representative node point z(k) in its center. For each location z in cell k we approximate the





Therefore, we calculate aggregate demand for store (i, ) as:
Di (nt,pt,φ t)=
P





where area(k) is the area of the rectangular cell k.
3.2 Computation of a MPE
AM P Ei saﬁxed point of the equilibrium mapping Γ that we deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 2 0 ) . T h e
evaluation of this equilibrium mapping requires one to integrate over all possible future paths of
the exogenous variables {εt,φ t}. We use Monte Carlo simulation to deal with this high-dimension
multiple-integration problem. Our algorithm computes a ﬁxed point of an equilibrium mapping ˜ ΓR
that is a simulated version of the mapping Γ. The subindex R represents the number of Monte Carlo
simulations used to approximate expected values. The main feature of ˜ ΓR is that ﬁrms calculate
the expected value associated with an action by using Monte Carlo simulation to integrate over
the path of future exogenous state variables. This means that only R future paths are assigned
a positive probability, while the rest of the paths receive zero probability. As R goes to inﬁnity,
the simulated mapping ˜ ΓR converges to Γ.B u t f o r ﬁnite R the mapping ˜ ΓR can still be a good
approximation to Γ. We might also consider that ˜ ΓR is the actual equilibrium mapping because,
due to computational costs, ﬁrms calculate their best responses by using Monte Carlo simulation.
12First, we simulate R independent sequences of length T for the exogenous state variables εit
and φt. We index simulated sequences by r, such that {εr
it : t =1 ,2,...,T} is the rth simulated
path for the private information shocks of ﬁrm i,a n d{φr
t : t =1 ,2,...,T} is the rth simulated
path of the demand conditions.12 Very importantly, these simulated sequences remain constant
over the iteration of the algorithm. Deﬁne {nr
t(a0,n0,φ 0,v):t =1 ,2,...,T} as the sequence
of networks given: (1) the rth simulated sequence of exogenous state variables; (2) the initial
conditions (a0,n0,φ 0); and (3) that every ﬁrm behaves according to their best response functions
given v. These simulated sequences of networks do change over the iteration of the algorithm
because the vector of value function v changes. Now, we can describe the simulated equilibrium
mapping ˜ ΓR(v) as {˜ ΓR,i(v):i ∈ Υ} such that:

















Step 0: We initialize the algorithm with a vector of values v0 such that v0
i(ai0,n0,φ 0)=0 , for any
state, player, and action. Step 1: Then, we calculate a new vector of values v1 using a Gauss-Jacobi
i t e r a t i o ni nt h em a p p i n g˜ ΓR. That is, for any player i,a n ys t a t e(n0,φ 0) and any action ai0,w e
calculate v1 as v1
i(ai0,n0,φ 0)=˜ ΓR,i(v0)(ai0,n0,φ 0). Step 2: If
° °v1 − v0° ° i ss m a l l e rt h a nap r e - ﬁxed
small constant, then vα∗
= v1. Otherwise, proceed to Step 1 with v0 = v1, and conduct another
round of Gauss-Jacobi iterations.
This algorithm computes value functions at every possible value of the state variables (n0,φ 0).
The number of possible values in the space of n0 is 2IL. This can be a huge number for values
of IL greater than 20. When the number of ﬁrms is relatively large, an assumption that reduces
signiﬁcantly the number of values in the space of n0 is symmetry among ﬁrms.I f ﬁrms have the
same quality of their products and marginal costs (i.e., ωi = ω and ci = c for any ﬁrm i) then,
the vector of arguments in the value function vi is (ai,n i,N −i,φ),w h e r eni is the network of ﬁrm
i,a n dN−i is the vector {N−i  :   =1 ,2,...,L} where N−i  ≡
P
j6=i nj  i st h en u m b e ro fs t o r e si n
location   from ﬁrms other than i. The number of values in the space of (ni,N −i) is (2I)L,w h i c hi sa
s m a l l e rn u m b e rt h a n2IL a n di ti sn o te x p o n e n t i a li nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms. However, the assumption
of symmetric ﬁrms is only useful when the number of ﬁrms is greater than 2 and the number of
locations is small. Otherwise, it does not imply any important reduction in computational cost.
However, some interesting applications involve two ﬁrms over many possible locations in a city or
region. For these cases, the use of interpolation can be useful. The idea is to compute the values
˜ ΓR,i(v)(ai,n,φ) over a grid of points of n and then interpolate these values to approximate the
mapping ˜ ΓR,i(v)(ai,n,φ) over the values of n w h i c ha r en o ti nt h eg r i d .
12When φt is autocorrelated, the simulated sequence for this variable depends on the initial condition φ0.I nt h a t
case, we should generate a diﬀerent simulated sequence for each possible value of the initial condition φ0.
134S p a t i a l p r e e m p t i o n
We apply the previous model to study spatial preemptive behavior. Spatial preemptive behavior
cannot be deﬁned or characterized in terms of primitives of the model. It is a characteristic of
ﬁrms’ equilibrium behavior in some dynamic games of entry in spatial markets. We start with a
deﬁnition of what we mean by preemptive behavior in the context of our model.
DEFINITION: An equilibrium in our model presents spatial preemptive behavior if, in the absence
of economies of density, equilibrium choice probabilities have the following properties.
(1) (Preemption): A ﬁrm’s probability of entry to become a monopolist in a local market
is larger when that ﬁrm is already a monopolist in a nearby local market.
(2) (Entry Deterrence): Suppose that a ﬁrm is a monopolist in a local market. The
probability that other ﬁrm enters in a nearby market is smaller if the monopolist is also
a monopolist in a nearby market.
(3) (Credibility): A ﬁrm’s probability of exit from a duopoly in a local market is smaller
when that ﬁrm is a monopolist in a nearby local market.
A key feature of spatial preemptive behavior is that there is a relationship between ﬁrms’
behavior in a local market and the (predetermined) market structure in nearby local markets.
That is, spatial preemptive behavior is a form of strategic interaction that is both spatial and
dynamic. Note that the deﬁnition includes the clause “in the absence of economies of density.”
Economies of density may generate some of these spatial-dynamic behavioral patterns. However,
in the case of economies of density, these patterns are not explained by strategic behavior but by
simple cost reductions.13 Here we concentrate in preemptive behavior and ignore economies of
density.14
To illustrate more formally the previous deﬁnition, consider a simple version of the model
with only two ﬁrms and two locations (i.e., I = L =2 ) and where the demand conditions φt are
constant over time. The market structure in a local market can take four possible values: zero ﬁrms;
monopoly of ﬁrm 1; monopoly of ﬁrm 2; and duopoly. We represent these market structures using
the symbols ∅, M1, M2,a n dD, respectively. Following the deﬁnitions of the equilibrium choice
probabilities in section 2.4.2, let Pi( +|n ,n − ) be the probability that ﬁrm i enters in market  
given that the market structures in the two local markets are n  and n− . Similarly, Pi( −|n ,n − )
is the probability that ﬁrm i exits from market   conditional on the initial market structures n 
13For instance, suppose that there is only one multi-store ﬁrm in the city and that the costs of this monopolist
present economies of density. It is clear that condition (1) should be a characteristic of the optimal behavior of this
monopolist.
14For studies that analyze empirically spatial preemption and economies of density, see West (1981), Holmes (2006)
and Vicentini (2006).
14and n− .15 Our deﬁnition of spatial preemptive behavior implies the following inequalities between
equilibrium choice probabilities (for i 6= j): (1) preemption, Pi( +|∅,M i) >P i( +|∅,∅); (2) entry
deterrence, Pj( +|Mi,M i) <P j( +|∅,M i); and (3) credibility, Pi( −|D,Mi) <P i( −|D,∅).
A c c o r d i n gt ot h i s ,w ed e ﬁne the following index, which should be positive under condition (1):
Preemption Index ≡ Pi( +|∅,M i) − Pi( +|∅,∅) (24)
For models with two ﬁrms but more than two locations, we construct the index in the following
way. For any location  ,l e t ∗ be the business location in the city that is closer to  . When looking
at entry/exit probabilities in location  , we represent the vector of networks n as (n ,n  ∗,n −( , ∗)),
where n  and n ∗ h a v et h es a m ed e ﬁnition as before, and n−( , ∗) represents the vector with the
spatial market structure at locations other than   and  ∗. Then, we deﬁned the index as:
Preemption Index ≡ Average
©
Pi( +|∅,M i,n −( , ∗)) − Pi( +|∅,∅,n −( , ∗))
ª
(25)
w h e r et h ea v e r a g ei so v e ra l lt h el o c a t i o n s  a n do v e ra l lt h ep o s s i b l ev a l u e so fn−( , ∗).
As mentioned in the introduction, the importance of Judd (1985)’s article was to emphasize
that, in order for an incumbent ﬁrm to eﬀectively spatially preempt a market through multi-store
positioning, a full consideration of store substitutability, entry costs, and exit values is needed.
Once exit is allowed the potential entrant recognizes that upon entry into one of the incumbent
submarkets, the incumbent’s self-cannibalization is exacerbated by the augmented price competition
in the duopoly submarket, which may lead it to leave that market if exit costs are low enough. This
forward-looking behavior of the potential entrant impacts the credibility of the preemptive motive
by the incumbent. In sum, the credibility of preemptive behavior can in principle be parametrized
by entry costs, exit values, and the distance (substitutability) amongst locations (submarkets).
However, it is complicated to establish ex-ante for which speciﬁcations of the primitives of the
model preemptive behavior is more likely. To investigate the relationship between some structural
parameters and spatial preemption, we perform some numerical experiments. In particular, we
compute the MPE for diﬀerent levels of entry costs, exit values, and consumer transportation
costs. For each equilibria we measure preemptive behavior by using our preemption index. We
also analyze the implications of preemptive behavior on market outcomes by looking at market
structure, proﬁtability of ﬁrms, and price markup.
4.1 Benchmark model
The following parameters are constant over our experiments.
(a) The Market. The city is a unit square, C =[ 0 ,1]2, and consumers are uniformly distributed on
C with population size equal to 10. Both the geographical distribution of consumers and population
15Of course, the probability of entry is zero if ﬁrm i is already an incumbent in market  , and the probability of
exit is zero if ﬁrm i is not active in that market.
15size are constant over time. The transportation cost parameter τ will vary in our experiments. We
consider a simple speciﬁcation for the space of feasible business locations. There are two locations
(L =2 )w i t hz1 =( 0 .2,0.5) and z2 =( 0 .8,0.5). Therefore the market and the locations are






(b) Firms. There are two multi-stores ﬁrms (I =2 ) which are potential entrants in the local
markets of this city. These ﬁrms are identical in terms of the quality of their products, which
is set at ω1 = ω2 =1 . The parameter μ, that measures the importance of horizontal product
diﬀerentiation, is equal to 0.25. Firms are also identical in their cost structures. Marginal costs are
equal to one.16 Fixed operating costs are normalized to zero. The common knowledge component
of entry costs and exit values are constant across markets. For the benchmark model we set entry
costs at θEC =1and exit values at θEV =0for every location. However, we analyze the eﬀects of
changes in both of these parameters. The private information parts of entry costs and exit values
have standard normal distributions which are independently distributed across ﬁrms and locations
a n do v e rt i m e .T h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ri ss e tt oβ =0 .9.
We obtain the MPE for diﬀerent values of exit values, entry costs, and consumer transportation
costs. In particular, we consider a grid for exit values of θEV ∈ {−3.0,−2.5,...,2.0}, for entry costs
of θEC ∈ {0,0.2,...,2.0}, and for transportation costs of τ ∈ {0.0,0.5,1.0}. For each simulation
path we consider T =1 5time periods and we simulate R =7 0 0paths.
16To give an idea of the range of price cost margins associated with diﬀerent values of ω, μ,a n dc,n o t et h a t
with zero transportation costs the unique Nash-Bertrand equilibrium (see the proof of equilibrium uniqueness in the




1+I exp{(ω − c − m)/μ}
1+( I − 1)exp{(ω − c − m)/μ}

With I =2 , ω =1 , μ =0 .25,a n dc =1 , the solution is m =0 .307, which is a 30.7% markup.
164.2 Results
First, we analyze the eﬀect of changes in exit values given three diﬀerent values for the transporta-
tion cost parameter. We compute the MPE’s associated with the values of θEV ∈ {−3.0,−2.5,...,2.0}
and τ ∈ {0.0,0.5,1.0}. The value of the entry cost is held ﬁxed at θEC =1 . Figure 3 displays
the average values of the spatial preemption index, the number of total stores, variable proﬁts per
store, and markup, based on simulations from each equilibria.
FIGURE 3
MPE Features for Diﬀerent Values of θEV and τ
For ranges of θEV where exit is very expensive (i.e.,b e l o w−1), the preemption index is the
highest, as expected from the analysis in Judd (1985). In this case, entry into a submarket entails
commitment to that location, and the probability of exit is very small given the prohibitive exit
costs, as the top right panel shows the number of stores in equilibrium to be basically 4. The
preemptive motive declines steadily for the most part as exit costs decline (or exit values increase),
which is a sign of the link between exit costs and the pursuit of preemption in equilibrium. For
exit values greater than one, the preemption index is very small and this means that there is not
any dynamic-spatial link between the two submarkets. That is, with that level of the exit value,
spatial preemption is not a credible equilibrium strategy.
It is also interesting to note that the higher the transportation costs, the lower the preemptive
behavior in equilibrium. With τ =0and τ =0 .5 the two business locations are very close
17substitutes, and the strategic interaction across locations matters most, with ﬁrms attempting to
take the second location before the competitor does. With higher transportation costs (τ =1 ), the
two submarkets become markets on their own, since the substitutability between the two locations
declines, and the equilibrium behavior in a local market is no longer so dependent on the market
structure in nearby local markets.
The upper right panel in ﬁgure 3 shows the number of stores. Very interestingly, the number
of stores declines with the exit value θEV. Note that a “partial equilibrium” analysis, that ignores
strategic interactions, would predict that the larger the exit value, the larger the number of stores.
However, once we include dynamic strategic interactions and the preemption motive, this prediction
does not hold. With a low exit value, ﬁrms show preemptive behavior and this leads to a large
number of stores in equilibrium. For high exit values, this is no longer true. Now, ﬁrms do not
have a preemptive motive and they end up having, on average, just one store each.
Next, we analyze the eﬀect of changes in entry costs given three diﬀerent values for τ.W e
compute the MPE’s associated with the values of θEC ∈ {0,0.2,...,2.0} and τ ∈ {0.0,0.5,1.0}.
The exit value is held ﬁxed at θEV =0 , so that the level of entry costs are equivalent to sunk
costs. Figure 4 displays the equilibrium preemption index, number of total stores, variable proﬁts
per store, and markup.
FIGURE 4
MPE Features for Diﬀerent Values of θEV and τ
18The preemption index declines for entry costs between 0 and 1, but then it increases for values
above 1, especially for low values of transportation costs. Therefore the value of commitment to
a location, as parametrized by θEC, seems to increase the index when the substitutability among
stores is greater (lower τ), which is similar to the ﬁndings in ﬁgure 3 for exit values. In fact, the
level of commitment and sunk costs, as parametrized by either very negative values of θEV in ﬁgure
3( a so n em o v e st o w a r d st h eleft of its panels), or high positive values of θEC in ﬁgure 4 (as one
moves towards the right of its panels), seem to dictate the market structure, conduct, and strategic
interaction in equilibrium. Moreover, the degree to which such commitment aﬀects the equilibrium
behavior is accentuated by lower levels of transportation costs, since then the competition among
ﬁrms is ﬁercer and so are strategic interactions such as preemptive behavior.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper proposes a dynamic model of an oligopoly industry characterized by spatial competition
between multi-store ﬁrms. Firms compete in prices and decide where to open or close stores
depending on the spatial market structure. We deﬁne and characterize a Markov Perfect Equilibria
(MPE) in this model. Our framework is a useful tool to study multi-store competition issues that
involve spatial and dynamic considerations. An algorithm to compute an equilibrium of the model
is proposed. The algorithm exploits simulation techniques recently proposed in Rust (1997) and in
Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2006). Its main idea is that when ﬁrms calculate the expected value
associated with a possible action, they do it by integrating only through the most likely paths
of future exogenous state variables. We illustrate the model and the algorithm with numerical
experiments that analyze how the propensity of multi-store ﬁrms to spatial preemptive behavior
depends on the magnitude of entry costs, exit value, and transportation costs. We ﬁnd that
higher levels of commitment to a particular location, as parametrized by sunk costs, and higher
substitutability between locations, as parametrized by lower consumer transportation costs, entails
higher propensity by multi-store ﬁrms to engage in spatial preemption.
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